In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 29-B of the Industries (Development and Regulations () Act, 1951(65 of 1951) the central Government hereby makes the following further amendment in the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Industry (Department of Industrial Development Number S.O. 477 (E) dated the 25th July, 1991 namely. In Schedule II to the said notification Item 4, relating the sugar and the entries hereunder shall be omitted.”

                                   According to Mr. S.P. Gupta learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner de-llcensing of the sugar Industry by the Union of India respondent no. 1 herein without amending the industries Development and regulation Act (hereinafter called the said Act”) is wrongful. This is an executive attempt to deregulate the sugar Industry by Invoking power of exemption under the said Act without parliamentary sanction. It is contrary to Industrial Policy and has far reaching effect on the Satiate Legislation especially with special reference to the State of Uttar Pradesh. Section 29-B of the said Act gives power to the Government to make certain specific exemption, which cannot be generals. Generals. By such device the Government has usurped the power of the development of the scheduled Industry. That does not necessarily mean that the Government should loose the control upon the Industry. Development of the Industry is to be made by the central Government in consultation of the concerned state Both the central and the state Government had communicated several other regulations and framed Rules etc. to regulate the supply and to ensure equitable distribution of sugar and related raw material such as sugarcane. The procurement of sugarcane the sale and price of sugar the price of the and (D.L.F. Housing construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Delhi Municipal Corps. And others) and AIR 1976 SC 475 (Arya) Vs as a Sashay etc. Vs. The Commissioner of Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Hyderabad and another) the respondent no. 6 wanted to satisfy the court on the on the point that disputed question of facts can not be interfered with such proposition. But the fact remains legally or validity of issuance of press Note and notifications by the authority can certainly be the mater of judicial review under review under with jurisdiction and by no means the same can be construed as disputed questions of facts. It is well-settled principle of law that jurisdictions of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. But by no means when jurisdiction of questions of fundamental rights natural justice jurisdiction of the authority and virus of the Act are challenged can be regarded as a disputed question of fact even upon a conservative outlook. Each and every fact is disputed. Unless dispute as regards fact exists one can not invoke the jurisdiction of the court of law. We have to see the level of factual dispute. Since the writ court has no fact finding machinery and alterative remedy is available in most of the cases High court discourages the litigants from invoking the jurisdiction. The guiding principle would be that whether fact is prevailing the law or law is prevailing the fact. If law is prevailing the fact as herein there is no matter whether any dispute as regards fact is available or not but the writ court will be guided with the question of law. Precisely in this case we do not find any disputed question of fact, which is so material that the court will ignore the vital question of declining on the basis of the press note and notification and conclude only on such fact. Therefore such explanation is totally unacceptable.

Page No   1 | 2 | 3